 
Негосударственное образовательное учреждение высшего профессионального образования
«Камский институт гуманитарных и инженерных технологий»
Вестник КИГИТ
СЕРИЯ 6. Отечественная история. Методы исто-рического исследования. История науки и техники.
№ 06 (24) · 2012
Ижевск 2012
ББК 60 УДК 378
Редакционный совет: председатель – докт. техн. наук, проф., академик Никулин В.А.; зам. председателя – канд. экон. наук, PhD, доцент, канд. экон. наук, академик РИА Дегтева О.А.; ответственный секретарь – начальник НИЧ Лойферман М.А.
Ответственный редактор серии: канд. ист. наук, зав. каф. ГТЖ НОУ ВПО КИГИТ Зайцева Е.Н.
Члены совета: докт. техн. наук, проф., чл.-корр. РАН Гусев Б.В.; канд. техн. наук, академик МИА Фомин П.М.; канд. экон. наук, доцент, член–корреспондент ИА УР Мохначев С.А.; докт. техн. наук, ст.н.с., чл.-корр. РИА Толстых А.В.; докт. экон. наук, проф., академик МИА Тумаев В.А.; докт. техн. наук, проф., академик РИА Григорьев Б.А.; канд. экон. наук, доцент Суетин С.Н.; докт. техн. наук, про-
фессор Митюков Н.В.
Рецензенты: Российская инженерная академия (РИА); Удмуртское отделение Российской инженерной академии, секция РИА «Проблемы инженерного и науч-ного образования».
Вестник КИГИТ: СЕРИЯ 6. Отечественная история. Методы исторического исследо-вания. История науки и техники. Ижевск: Издательство КИГИТ, 2012. 162 с.
НОУ ВПО «Камский институт гуманитарных и инженерных технологий», 2012
СОДЕРЖАНИЕ
Crawford K.R. Hitting the target. Naval fire control 1860 to 1900 4
Гринин Л.Е. Периодизации исторического процесса и выделение ран-
него нового времени как самостоятельного периода 27
Гринин Л.Е. Опасность социально-политического кризиса в процессе
модернизации 39
Гринин Л.Е., Коротаев А.В. О некоторых сходствах в методах и объек-
те исследования в истории и макроэволюции 64
Лапшин Р.В. Первые 100 лет пароходства на Селигере 88
Матвеев Д.В. Опыт строительства первых пароходов на Камско-
воткинском железоделательном заводе 101
Митюков Н.В., Лапшин Р.В. Испанские траулеры для русского Севера 105
Никитин И.Н. Косово между автономией и независимостью. Опреде-
ление статуса края в 2005-2008 гг 110
Пислегин Н.В. Русские в Удмуртском Прикамье с древности и до нача-
ла ХХ века 119
Порцева Л.П., Митюков Н.В., Лапшин Р.В. Пароходы постройки ижев-
ских заводов 128
Романчук А.А., Цвигун Ю.О. Антропонимическая модель на –ай в ис-
торическом русском ареале и вопрос о дославянском субстрате 131
Харук А.И. Морская авиация США в десантных операциях в европе в
1944 г 153
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УДК 94(4)"1492/1914"
K.R. Crawford, Dr. Sc., Prof. of Natural history
Gunnery Fire Control Group (USA)
HITTING THE TARGET. NAVAL FIRE CONTROL 1860 TO 1900
It is a common misconception that modern Naval Fire Control and gunnery was a XX cen-tury development, solely beholding to Sir Percy Scott and William Sims and the ‘Gunnery Revolu-tion’ they launched, and that the ‘art’ of gunnery had changed little since the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. Thus, the pioneering work of Bradley A. Fiske, A.P. Davydov and Sir George Elliot, amongst others, is discounted and ignored. This article seeks to look at the progress of the last 30 years of the XIX century to place the ‘Gunnery Revolution’ in its proper context.
Существует распространенное заблуждение, что современные системы управления артиллерийским огнем появились лишь в ХХ веке и представляли собой развитие идей "Ар-тиллерийской революции" сэра Перси Скотта и Уильяма Симса, а более раннее искусство стрельбы оставалось практически неизменным со времен Трафальгара в 1805 г. В результате вклад таких пионерских работ как работы Бредли Фиске, А.П. Давыдова и сэра Джорджа Элликота полностью игнорируется. Предлагаемая работа – попытка рассмотреть прогресс последних тридцати лет XIX века и рассмотрение "Артиллерийской революции" в контексте этих событий.
Key words: Naval, fire control, gun, artillery.
Ключевые слова: военно-морской, управление огнем, орудие, артиллерия.
It is a common misconception, even among Naval Historians, that until Percy Scott and William Sims began the so-called Gunnery Revolution in the Royal and U.S Navies at the beginning of the twentieth century, the "art" of gunnery had changed little since the time of Trafalgar. This view overlooks the fact that Scott did not invent the Director, but resurrected the device and applied modern technology to the pre-existing concept and equipments1. It also pre-supposes that such problems as deflection and roll were beyond
1 John Brooks, “Percy Scott and the Director,” Warship 1996 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1996), p. 150 & 155. And Peter Padfield, Aim Straight: A Biography of Sir Percy Scott, the father of modern naval gunnery (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1966), pp. 189 – 190. This is confirmed also by the “…stealing a master sight and other fittings from [old] ships in reserve…” on which more below.
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comprehension, and completely discounts the scientific work of Bradley A. Fiske and A.P. Davydov, two of the prolific inventors of the age.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Hans Busk, writing in 1859, describes the gunnery problem as follows:
"…in firing at a moving object as at a steamer passing, we will suppose at twelve knots per hour, allowance must be made for her speed, and a point must be aimed at a-head of her, to be determined by her distance and rate of motion. But this is not all: an 8-inch shell takes two seconds to travel 450 yards, to that the gunner having in the first place made the closest approximate estimate of the distance of the vessel to be struck, has to calculate her rate and then to fix upon an imaginary point in her line of course at which she and the shell may arrive simultaneously, taking heed, moreover, if there be much sea on, to fire when the deck of his own vessel is horizontal, or at any rate with a falling in preference to a rising side"2
Indeed, “The first recorded system…is probably Philip Broke’s 1807 – 13 method of laying the broadside guns to an ordered elevation…and…angle of training so that their fire could be directed on a target which the individual gun captains could not see.” A Cap-tain W. Moorsom, RN, had introduced a "director" in the early 1850s to address the issues noted above. Located in a convenient position and manned by an officer, the target bear-ing, heel, and range were determined, and the guns laid accordingly. The officer gave the order to fire when the target came into his sights3. The entire process was verbal. One can imagine the designated officer asking the master Gunner for the range, estimated by eye and perhaps with the benefit of experience, then performing some quick calculations, af-ter which instructions were shouted to the Lieutenants in charge of the batteries for the laying of the guns. After an appreciable interval, the shouted order to fire is given, and within seconds, each battery discharges. So far, so good, but can the process be repeated in the din of readying the guns for subsequent rounds? One suspects that, given the communications technology of the period, effectiveness of the system was limited to the first salvo/broadside only.
Poor communications was, however, only part of the problem. The guns them-selves tended to be quite heavy and bulky. In broadside mounts, this mattered little as their traverse was limited, though this required the ship to maneuver to line up the guns with their target. For fire at other angles, pivot guns were common. Their carriages were mounted on a system of tracks or races, which enabled them to be moved from one side of the ship to the other, or cover the angles in between. But even in 1877, "…the crews of
Hans Busk, The Navies of the World (London: Rutledge, Warnes, and Rutledge, 1859), p.239.
Brooks, op.cit., p. 155.
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both [of Shah's] 9" guns had trouble moving their massive weapons from one broadside to the other over the races4."
Mounting guns in turrets or on turntables en barbette was less of a solution than commonly thought at the time. The early turrets were traversed by hand. In the case of the Huascar, for example, "it took sixteen men fifteen minutes to turn it through 360 de-grees5." Later, and larger, turrets and turntables were steam powered, though Inflexible's were powered by Rendel's hydraulic system, which had been experimentally used in the Thunderer, which allowed "a complete rotation …in just over a minute6."
But the problem was one of tracking the target. Obviously, the hand operated tur-rets were much too slow, while the steam and hydraulic powered turrets and turntables lacked the necessary control, especially given their fixed loading position requirements. Like communications, the available technology was not sufficient for the task.
At any kind of range, gunnery was exceedingly bad, and the existing fire control system, such as it was, proved inadequate. In 1870, the ironclads Monarch, Captain, and Hercules took part in gunnery experiments off Vigo. Each ship was to fire for five minutes at a rock 600 feet long and 60 feet high, "or twice as long and four times as high as a ship." At a range of about 1,000 yards, "Hercules fired seventeen shot, of which ten hit; Captain fired eleven shot, and made four hits; Monarch fired twelve shot, and made nine hits." But according to Captain Philip Colomb, had the rock been moving, none of the shot would have hit!7
New technologies, however, promised at least partial solutions. In the British Royal Navy, the implementation of electric ignition of the firing charge, around 1868 or so, pro-vided a tactic that would enhance effectiveness. It required that the guns be laid on a pre-determined angle, and then the ship would maneuver to bring the guns in line. At that point, the firing circuit would be closed. Oscar Parkes described this gunnery tactic as used in conjunction with ramming:
"It was intended to withdraw the [gun crews] from these [broadside 9"] guns to the armoured forecastle [in Shannon] after they had been laid, and then fire them by electric-ity when passing the enemy if an attempt to ram failed.
"As in the Shannon salvo firing was to be the special form of attack, the guns being loaded and laid under cover of the end bulkheads [of Northampton] and fired electrically
Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani, Ironclads at War (Philadelphia: Combined Publish-ing, 1998), p.288.
Ibid., pp.289 – 290.
Oscar Parkes, British Battleships (London: Seeley Service & Co. Ltd., 1957), p.254.
Sir Thomas Brassey, The British Navy: Its Strength, Resources, and Administration, 5 Vols. (London: Longman, Green, and Co., 1882), Vol. III, p.418.
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without the crews being exposed in a close engagement. The broadside having been dis-charged, she was then to turn bows on, reload, and again maneuver for another broadside8."
It should be noted that
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